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The current paradigm of Artificial Intelligence emerged as the result
of a series of cultural innovations, some technical and some social. Among
them are apparently small design decisions, that led to a subtle reframing
of the field’s original goals, and are by now accepted as standard. They
correspond to technical shortcuts, aimed at bypassing problems that were
otherwise too complicated or too expensive to solve, while still delivering
a viable version of AI. Far from being a series of separate problems, recent
cases of unexpected effects of AI are the consequences of those very choices
that enabled the field to succeed, and this is why it will be difficult to solve
them. In this chapter we review three of these choices, investigating their
connection to some of today’s challenges in AI, including those relative to
bias, value alignment, privacy and explainability. We introduce the notion
of “ethical debt” to describe the necessity to undertake expensive rework
in the future in order to address ethical problems created by a technical
system.
1 Introduction
Science and especially technology are partly shaped by social and cultural ele-
ments, including practices that are so commonly accepted that are not noticed
or questioned. These are often conveyed through exemplar stories of good prac-
tice in a field, which Thomas Kuhn has called “paradigms”. Paradigm shifts
are remarkable moments of scientific creativity, but also have consequences be-
yond science. We review three crucial ‘mutations’ that are behind the current
paradigm of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and we argue that they are also re-
sponsible for the current ‘ethical debt’ of the field, a concept that we introduce
to indicate the necessity to undertake expensive reworking in order to address
ethical concerns.
A series of concerns have emerged over the past few years, following the
widespread deployment of services powered by Artificial Intelligence. These
include ubiquitous - and often invisible - software agents that make personalised
decisions, from the recommendation of news items or videos to the filtering of
emails, among others. These concerns are often treated as design flaws that can
be separately addressed, and research has already begun in that direction. We
1
argue that they are instead the direct result of the paradigm shift undertaken by
AI two decades ago, more specifically of three important shortcuts that enabled
the present methodology to develop. We term the cost of reworking the systems
into a state that is compliant with current social expectations “ethical debt” -
in analogy with the established notion of technical debt in software engineering
- and we trace its cultural origins to the the very paradigm shift that led to
the present version of AI, which we call “data-driven”. To explain this, we
need to briefly recapitulate the recent stages of AI evolution, and observe how
“technology” does not refer just to an algorithm, but rather to the complex of
people, norms, algorithms, data and infrastructure that are required for any
of these services to exist. Addressing the current challenges in AI may require
adapting all of the above.
The first truly viable and profitable form of Artificial Intelligence has grad-
ually emerged over the past two decades, but it has been just over the past few
years that its social impact has been felt, as a result of its pervasive deployment.
Both a unified data infrastructure and various AI technologies had to co-evolve,
before they could really benefit from each other, and then benefit society. As AI
found its place in our lives, we have become more aware of problems with this
technology: mass surveillance, personalised targeting of adverts, disinformation,
biased decision making and unexplainable decisions.
In order to understand where those ‘pathologies’ of AI originated from, we
need to review how AI came to take its present shape, from the dream of a
reasoning computer to the reality of statistical data-driven systems based on the
web. As we briefly recall this journey we can point out some crucial shortcuts
that allowed the field to move faster - and more cheaply - towards viable and
profitable products. These shortcuts were part of an important paradigm shift
that the research community underwent, about 20 years ago. The recent story of
AI is the story of how we avoided building expensive models of phenomena which
we do not yet understand, such as language and vision, contenting ourselves with
just emulating specific ‘skills’ (such as spell-checking or handwriting recognition)
by exploiting statistical correlations found in large masses of data. Machine-
learning algorithms and large masses of data could be used to find those valuable
patterns.
This shifted the focus of researchers away from modeling the behaviour or
skill to be implemented (perhaps by understanding its underlying mechanisms),
and towards securing vast amounts of observations of that behaviour, which
could be used as training data for statistical learning algorithms.
This new problem - of collecting training data - was in turn bypassed by
the practice of using data sourced “from the wild”, an expression that indicates
data which was already pre-existing as a byproduct of other activities. But the
problem remained - in many cases - of annotating this data, in order to inform
the agent about its intended behaviour: autonomous agents only have goals
because of some definition of success or failure, which is either provided by the
designer, or acquired directly from observing the user in the case of learning
agents. While this calls for some form of user feedback, this need was bypassed
too, by making use of various proxies (eg using click-through rates as a proxy
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for user satisfaction), generally called ‘implicit feedback’.
Taken all together, these and other shortcuts enabled us to generate a version
of autonomous agents at a very low immediate cost. We now have to face the
longer term cost of those decisions, which caused part of the “ethical debt”
built into our AI infrastructure. Ensuring the fairness of machine decisions,
their transparency, the privacy of users, compliance with new regulations, and
securing services against surveillance or hostile manipulations, all will come at
the significant cost of reworking the technology at a fundamental level. And
in some cases it is conceivable that we might be unable to provide equivalent
services in a socially acceptable way - in this case the trade offs between accuracy
and social constraints will need to be clearly communicated to lawmakers and
the public, so that decisions can be made in the appropriate venues.
In this chapter we review the key design decisions that led to the current
version of AI, introduce the notions of ‘ethical debt’ and ‘data supply chain’
as key concepts to develop safer AI, propose a distinction between explicit and
implicit information used to analyse AI systems, as well as the notion of ‘mis-
aligned proxies’. We hope that identifying and naming problems and practices
is helpful in the process of critiquing and regulating this important area of re-
search. In no way is this review intended to criticize the scientific contributions
discussed in this chapter, just to offer a critique with the benefit of hindsight.
2 Shortcuts and Debt
Current AI exists in symbiosis with the unified data infrastructure that has
emerged over the past two decades, combining and replacing previous infras-
tructures for telecommunications, banking, retail, and more. As always in tech-
nology studies, we cannot separate technical innovations from their social con-
text. Business models for AI and Web co-evolved and resulted in very profitable
systems powered by autonomous agents, which interact on a daily basis with
millions of people. That is where the first problems started emerging, so we will
examine the cultural steps that took us to this moment.
While the notion of ‘paradigm shift’ is well known, and we have already
discussed it in this context [9, 8], we should introduce a lesser known concept
that will be useful in our discussion.
Technical Debt is a notion used in software engineering to describe the ad-
ditional cost that will have to be paid in the future as the result of taking a
shortcut when developing a software system. In was introduced in 1992 [15] by
Ward Cunningham, who noticed the many analogies with an actual debt: while
this could be part of a deliberate strategy, in situations where fast deployment
is desired, it can also accumulate interest, making it increasingly difficult to im-
plement changes later on. Taking shortcuts essentially borrows from the future,
when essential rework will be needed.
A related concept in economics is that of Externality, referring to the cost
incurred by a third party which has no control on the creation of that cost [4].
These costs can be either individual or of an entire society, and emerge as the
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result of them consuming a service.
We use these terms to observe that AI is in a state of “ethical debt”, which
we define as a technical debt where the future costs are not due to technical
sustainability issues, but to the need to address ethical issues such as external-
ities imposed on the users. This article attempts to identify the origins of AI’s
ethical debt, which are both technical and cultural, so that addressing them will
require more than just technical solutions. This is the story of how we tried to
have a free lunch and ended up in debt, - and of how we might go about paying
it back.
3 Stages of a Paradigm Shift
The way AI was imagined and pursued by its pioneers involved discovering
some grand principles - say, for example, those underlying natural vision or
language - and then using them to design artificial systems to complete some
tasks related to vision or language. This approach was based on how other
forms of engineering worked: for example space engineering, where the design
follows an explicit understanding of the underlying physical laws. Identifying
and using the mechanisms behind a skill or behaviour implied assuming a form
of causal thinking; for example machine translation should follow after having
understood the mechanisms behind the generation of language.
Much of early AI research focused on variations of logical reasoning, taking
reasoning to be a fundamental part of generating intelligent behaviour, and
using the chess-match as a powerful metaphor for how reasoning should work:
cleverly examining alternative courses of action and selecting the most promising
one. The necessary domain knowledge could be provided to them, possibly as
explicit rules and axioms [11, 10, 8].
That approach to AI, which lasted for decades, failed to deliver viable trans-
lation or vision systems, and currently is not what powers the recent success
stories of AI. Instead, starting from the late 1990s, researchers in an increasing
number of domains settled for a practical approach that allowed them to bypass
the frustrating attempt to list explicit rules behind complex phenomena such as
vision or language.
By collecting large amounts of training data, they were able to use statis-
tical learning algorithms to produce the desired behaviour, or a version of it.
For example, in this way they could develop systems to recognise images of
handwritten digits, to translate text, and to flag spam emails.
This alternative approach produced its own set of success stories starting
from machine translation [3] and handwriting recognition [28], and then spread-
ing to a number of tasks, including product recommendation, spelling correc-
tion, spam filtering. Every time, researchers discovered that it was possible to
complete a task without the need for the computer to explicitly represent, or
understand, the contents of text or images, nor any underlying mechanisms,
by just exploiting statistical correlations found in the training data, to obtain a
sort of implicit model. This implicit model was formed mostly by large amounts
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of data, and by simple statistical rules that allow this data to be exploited. 1
What resulted was a new generation of data-driven AI systems, which did
away with explicit representations, complex algorithms, and all previous ex-
pectations, and just focused on the generation of the required behaviour in
machines, by exploiting subtle statistical correlations in vast amounts of data.
Machine learning, optimization and data took centre stage, as described in the
book [29], and a rush began to gather valuable data [11, 10].
Changing the definition of what counts as ‘success’ in science is the very
essence of a paradigm shift, and this definition is often implicitly encoded in the
success stories celebrated in a community or taught to students. We have already
noted how Artificial Intelligence underwent a paradigm shift about two decades
ago [9], by giving itself permission to take certain shortcuts and therefore -
implicitly - to subtly redefine its goals.
Some of the lessons, and a beautiful account of that mindset, can be found
in [19], as well as in [29, 8]. Importantly, that new set of success stories also
suggested a series of shortcuts to be followed when designing intelligent systems.
Correlation vs. Causation. One important consequence of training sta-
tistical algorithms to emulate the decisions or behaviours of humans (eg rec-
ommending a book) is that we no longer value the reason why the decision is
made, so long as the action it generates is appropriate. Predictions count more
than explanations, knowing ‘what’ counts more than knowing ‘why’, and - as
summarised in [29] - ‘correlation trumps causation’.
By this slogan, the authors meant that (in the practice of AI as well as
other areas of science) there was a change: a focus on establishing and exploit-
ing causal links is replaced by a focus on establishing and exploiting correla-
tional links. While this had been traditionally seen as a fallacy, it became com-
mon practice in those domains where the traditional (hypothetical-deductive)
method had not worked.
This position was best described in [1], a popular and influential article
which hailed “the end of theory”, which was brought about by applying data-
driven methods to science. That article summarised this shift as: “(...) faced
with massive data, this approach to science — hypothesize, model, test — is
becoming obsolete (...) There is now a better way. Petabytes allow us to say:
”Correlation is enough.” We can stop looking for models. We can analyze the
data without hypotheses about what it might show. ” The article supports its
provocative claims by noting that - in order for Google to recommend pages -
”no semantic or causal analysis is required”.
One year later, the paper [19] notes: “early work on machine translation
relied on elaborate rules for the relationships between syntactic and semantic
patterns in the source and target languages. Currently, statistical translation
models consist mostly of large memorized phrase tables that give candidate map-
1This step also relates to statistical use of “non-parametric” models in lieu of parametric
ones: nonparametric models differ from parametric ones in that the number and nature of the
parameters is not fixed before seeing the data. Most modern machine-learning methods are
nonparametric, and therefore they do not use the data as in classical statistics to estimate the
value of a variable with a precise meaning within a theoretical framework.
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pings between specific source- and target-language phrases. Instead of assuming
that general patterns are more effective than memorizing specific phrases, today’s
translation models introduce general rules only when they improve translation
over just memorizing particular phrases (for instance, in rules for dates and
numbers).”
While this shortcut saves the enormous cost of understanding and explicit
modelling, it creates another cost, which is that of sourcing vast masses of
relevant training data, and there is no reason - a priori - to expect that this cost
should be any smaller. Generating, curating and annotating high quality data
is a significant expense in several industries, eg in drug testing. This cost was
also bypassed by the AI industry.
Data from the Wild. The second shortcut was memorably summarised
in the paper [19] which draws general lessons from the success stories of speech
recognition and machine translation. It identifies the causes for those successes
in the availability of large amounts of data, already created for different pur-
poses. “In other words, a large training set of the input-output behaviour that
we seek to automate is available to us in the wild. In contrast, traditional NLP
problems such as (. . . ) POS tagging (...) are not routine tasks so they have
no large corpus available in the wild. Instead a corpus for these tasks requires
skilled human annotation. Such annotation is not only slow and expensive to ac-
quire, but also difficult for experts to agree on (...). The first lesson of web-scale
learning is to use available data rather than hoping for annotated data which
is not available. For example we find that useful semantic relationships can be
learned from the statistics of web queries, or from the accumulated evidence of
web-based text patterns and formatted tables, in both cases without needing any
manually annotated data”
Data gathered from the wild has been crucial in the design of object recog-
nition systems [16], face recognition [20, 21], machine translation [24], etc. The
ubiquitous word embeddings that allow us to represent the meaning of words
before we process them, are also all learned from data gathered from the wild
[30].
Having replaced modeling with data, and replaced generating data with
collecting it from the wild, takes AI designers very close to a free lunch, but
not quite all the way there. Often a learning algorithm needs to be told what
to do, and this comes in the form of supervision, or feedback. The user should
tell the agent which of its decisions was appropriate, and which was not: this
is a form of data annotation, or curation, that communicates to the agent its
intended behaviour.
Proxies and Implicit feedback. A further cultural step addressed this
problem. Rather than asking users explicitly what they wanted the AI system
to do - a chore that many users are reluctant to take on - designers started
making use of implicit feedback, which is another way to say that they replaced
unobservable quantities with cheaper proxies. This started early, for example
the paper [2] explains how to design document retrieval systems: “we make a
design decision not to require users to give explicit feedback on which hits were
good and which were bad (. . . ) instead we simply record which hits people
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follow, (. . . ) because the user gets to see a detailed abstract of each hit, we
believe that the hits clicked by each user are highly likely to be relevant (. . . )“.
It is reasonable to expect this proxy to be somewhat aligned with the elusive
quantity of “relevance to the user”, but understanding the misalignment between
a proxy and the intended target has become an important question for AI. This
happens particularly as ‘retrieval’ is replaced by ‘recommendation’, and the
business model of user ‘satisfaction’ is replaced by that of user ‘persuasion’. Is
the goal of the agent to maximise relevance, or just click-through rates? 2
The shift between retrieval and recommendation is very subtle, as they rely
on the very same set of techniques. After being used in retrieval, implicit feed-
back was also proposed as a way to improve recommender systems since 1998
[31], and clickthrough data were proposed since 2002 as a proxy for relevance in
search engines [23]. From the late 1990s Amazon and others were making use of
the feature “people who bought this also bought . . . ” which also makes a clever
use of implicit signals [34].
In each of these cases, the assumption is that the user’s actions reveal their
preferences, or needs, as well as (or even better than) would be done by an
explicit feedback. A problem that we need to address is the consequence of
using misaligned proxies in training autonomous agents.
Samples of user behaviour were first used by agents to learn general phenom-
ena, such as correct spelling. Then they were used to link the most relevant hits
to a given query. Finally they were used to infer an individual’s user preferences.
Along the way, incidentally, the focus started shifting from serving the users to
serving the advertisers. With each of those small decisions, the framing of the
goals in AI was slightly shifted, from causation to correlation, from retrieval to
recommendation, from understanding to behaving, from serving users to steer-
ing them, from making the data you need, to adapting your needs to whatever
data you can find.
These steps are what enabled a very low cost of entry for anyone to develop
AI agents: the statistical algorithms were simple, the data was available in the
wild, the curation or feedback signals were provided by the users implicitly.
Though each of these steps introduced assumptions and approximations, these
shortcuts promised us a nearly free passage to Artificial Intelligence: by the
2010s we were able to train systems to recognise (or guess) faces, intentions,
speech, recommendable products, unwanted emails, interesting videos, all based
on fully automated analysis of behavioural or other personal data that was freely
available online.
By that time we also had a global infrastructure through which these agents
could gather the data they needed, and they could provide very valuable services.
The users were presented with a new mass medium, that is constantly looking
back at them trying to guess their intentions, that learns from their behaviour,
and that remembers everything.
What came next was a lesson in externalities, unintended consequences and
2Although this definition is informal, it is possible to create formal definitions of alignment
between two learning tasks, eg [14].
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technical debt. Part of the problem was that we built AI agents by allowing
them to learn from data collected from the wild, and annotated by observing
human behaviour. But the other part of the problem was the special place that
those AI agents came to occupy within our data ecosystem. Before we discuss
the side effects of those shortcuts, we will briefly turn our attention to the data
ecosystem within which AI was deployed, as that is also part of the “recipe” for
current versions of AI.
4 A New Medium
The emergence of data-driven AI is directly connected to the emergence of a
unified data infrastructure, which is larger than just the World Wide Web,
but which we will occasionally call - for convenience - just Web (sensu lato).
This infrastructure resulted from the rapid convergence of various elements,
and the introduction of new ones: computer and telephone networks, personal
computers, mobile phones, ATM networks, and the various layers of hardware
and software that underpin all that, from the oceanic cables on the one end
to the personalised recommendation software on the other end. Importantly,
an understanding of this infrastructure must include cultural components too,
such as the legal systems regulating its parts, the business models, and social
acceptance.
For example: when we buy a book from Amazon, we may have accepted the
personalised suggestion of its recommender software, then we complete an online
payment, at which point on the other side a combination of robots and people
dispatches the book from a warehouse. International tax regulations, labour
laws, publishing laws, telecommunications and banking, all of these components
must be in place, before one can imagine such a service.
The rapid convergence of this global infrastructure created an ecosystem for
autonomous software agents to thrive: within that context they can have the
data they need to learn and improve, the necessary computing and physical
infrastructures, and the affordances that allow them to have a viable business
model.
It is within the context of the Web (sensu lato) that Intelligent Agents first
left the laboratory and ventured into the wild, finding a place within society and
becoming part of our daily lives. From there, they started to spread beyond.
But by then, Intelligent Agents looked nothing like we had imagined. Their
behaviour was generated by statistical signals discovered in vast masses of data
sourced from the wild, for which they were constantly hungry, and by cleverly
including humans as essential parts of their function, to annotate this data with
implicit signals [12].
The recommender agent that we find within Amazon (or Facebook, or a
spam filter) includes not only a statistical algorithm and a vast database of
past transactions, but also information about transactions that did not take
place: items that were suggested but not selected by users, time of day and
other contextual information, and so on. Truly it depends on samples of human
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behaviour to learn either what we want it to do (as in the spam filter) or what it
can make us do (as in the shopping recommendations). The difference between
the two is often just in the eye of the beholder: revealing preferences is not
different than revealing weaknesses [6] and the agent has no way of distinguishing
between the two.
So current intelligent agents include within themselves much more than an
algorithm: they include datasets of choices we made, and people who can be used
to test future conjectures, in this way providing crucial annotation for future
items, which are themselves often produced by humans too. Recommending
videos, news items, books, blocking emails, correcting spelling, are all common
examples of this symbiosis.
By the 2010s the convergence between data-driven AI and the Web was so
tight that neither could have existed without the other. They had co-evolved
to a point of symbiosis.
We would be wrong to think of this new mass medium as a sort of mod-
ern telegraph: far from being a passive communication line, it looks back at
us, partly understands the content of our communications and guesses our in-
tentions. Importantly, humans are both users and also participants of these
systems [12, 13].
5 The Recipe
The “secret sauce” that powers the current version of AI has an essential ingre-
dient: samples of human behaviour, often in the form of microchoices performed
by millions of users, to be used as proxies for more expensive signals; other ingre-
dients include statistical learning algorithms; a powerful infrastructure for the
collection of data and the delivery of services. Statistical learning algorithms
detect valuable patterns in the myriad signals generated by users’ behaviour,
these patterns are used to shape the actions of the macroscopic system, and
the infrastructure is used to deliver services, generating value as well as further
interaction.
We would be missing an important point if we imagined that the seat of
intelligence here is the algorithm, in fact algorithms are often changed within
current AI systems, without the users noticing. The intelligence is at the level
of the overall system, which is also robust to changes in its participants, and
its contents. For example, a video recommendation system owes its behaviour
to its current users, its historical data, its current contents and a (set of) ma-
chine learning algorithm. Each of them can change in time, without the agent
necessarily changing,
6 Consequences: a Rude Awakening
The recipe that gave us this version of AI involves replacing causal links with
correlations, explicit models with statistical correlations, cured training exam-
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ples with data from the wild, and explicit data annotations with implicit signals
and other proxies.
It rests on the strong assumption that our actions reveal information, such as
our preferences or factual knowledge of the world. It does not seem to consider
the possibility that our actions might also reveal our weaknesses and biases. Yet
the field of Computational Social Science has known for a long time that data
about online human behaviour does contain them in abundance [35, 27, 17, 22].
When an algorithm is mining terabytes of text, to “triangulate” the meaning of
a word such as ‘nurse’ or ‘pilot’ from the statistics of its everyday use, how can
it avoid also picking up subtle biases in the way people perceive those jobs, e.g.,
in terms of gender? When another algorithm is observing a user interacting
with a video recommendation website, can it really distinguish the information
needs of the user from their weaknesses, i.e. things that they do not reflectively
endorse, but cannot resist clicking on? [5, 6].
Considering this, it is not that surprising that unintended effects were ob-
served, when the first such agents were deployed at the centre of the global
data infrastructure, and expected to recommend news, target ads, screen ap-
plications, filter emails, and generally make meaningful decisions. One class of
problems followed directly from the need that modern AI has to keep track of our
online behaviour, to generate valuable data, while other problems emerged from
the use it made of this data: to learn word representations, user preferences, or
how to make decisions.
Privacy. In June 2013 The Guardian and the Washington Post reported
that intelligence agencies have access to the data of US internet companies
under a surveillance programme called Prism. This includes emails, live chats
and search histories. The revelation created a scandal, attracting attention to
the mass of personal data those companies stored. In 2017 the Observer and the
New York Times revealed that a Cambridge Analytica had used user information
from Facebook in order to extract psychometric information and better target
electoral ads. This revealed to the public the possibility that personal data can
be used both to manipulate behaviour and to infer sensitive private information
[5]. Insurance companies attempted to launch products whose price depends
on the personality of users, as inferred from their social media profiles. The
public became aware that over the years, an industry based on data-brokers has
emerged for the trading of valuable data about online behaviour.
Bias. Decisions made by algorithms have been suspected to suffer from
biases [33]. For example, in 2017 it was reported that job ads targeted at women
had a lower pay rate than jobs targeted at men; and that ads targeted at ethnic
minorities in the US contained racial biases. In 2017 it was also observed that
the word embeddings inferred from text collected in the wild contained evidence
both of gender and racial bias, a finding that might help explain the above
reports, when considered alongside documented topic-differences in gender bias
in the media [17, 22, 27]. All this would be picked up by a statistical algorithm
trying to learn the meaning of words [7, 35].
Manipulation. Recommender systems, such as those who propose videos
or news, are typically designed to try to maximise some measure of engagement,
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often click through rates. This is part of the implicit feedback shortcut. But
concerns are emerging that these systems might generate filter bubbles [32] or
induce excessive use of media. The use of proxies does not allow the agents to
distinguish why a user engages with an item: are users’ clicks revealing their
preferences, or are they revealing their weaknesses? In the second case, we would
have built a learning agent specialised in detecting and exploiting the individual
weaknesses of its users [5]. This is related to the problem of value alignment:
what the user wants, and what relevant annotation the machine can actually
find, are different quantities [18]. It is possible that designing recommenders
that only rely on explicit and direct communication from users would solve this
problem. Of course this would then suffer from the problem that some users do
not want to send this information to the agent, but possibly this should be an
option available to the users. Problems can also result from machines accessing
psychometric information at individual level, rather than at collective level [26].
Transparency. As we replaced explicit modeling, and representation of
causal links with predictions based on implicit statistical correlations, it is very
difficult for users to understand the reasons behind the decisions of a machine.
It is actually also very difficult to imagine how a machine can give such an
explanation, yet this has now become a legal right of European users. The first
shortcut is at work here, along with the other two - since the real reasons for
a machine’s decision depend both on the algorithm and on the data. Accuracy
of predictions has been privileged over other aspects of knowledge, in this way
subtly redefining what knowledge and models are for. Explainable models might
be less accurate, but more acceptable in specific domains. Either way, a trade-off
is likely to emerge.
7 Conclusions
What has been accomplished by the research community of AI over the past
20 years is remarkable, and it is not our purpose to point fingers or criticise
individual contributions to the field. With the benefit of hindsight we can
however reflect on how we introduced assumptions in our systems that are now
generating problems, so that we can work on repairing and regulating the current
version of AI. The same methods and principles can be perfectly innocuous in
certain domain, and become problematic only after being deployed in different
domains. This is the space where we will need better informed regulation.
Science and technology are partly shaped by social and cultural elements,
including practices that can be so commonly accepted as to go unnoticed.
These are often conveyed through success stories, which exemplify what and
how a scientific community should be doing. Thomas Kuhn called those sto-
ries ‘paradigms’ defining them as “universally recognized scientific achievements
that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of prac-
titioners” [25].)
Towards the turn of the century, the field of Artificial Intelligence has un-
dergone a ‘paradigm shift’, changing the exemplar success stories that define
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its quest [9, 8]. The current paradigm of Artificial Intelligence has been vari-
ously described as focused on accurate predictions rather than accurate models;
on detecting correlations rather than causation; on knowing ‘what’ rather than
knowing ‘why’. The use of so-called “non parametric models” is an example.
The statistical correlations that power this type of intelligent behaviour are
extracted from datasets that are collected “from the wild” as recommended in
[19]; finally, the current paradigm calls - or at least allows - for data annotation
to be performed by using proxies or “implicit signals” such as the preferences
revealed by user’s activity, rather than explicit communicative acts directed at
the agent.
Taken together these practices nearly deliver a “free lunch”, since they do
enable valuable predictions and decisions to be generated based on inexpensive
data. Because of this, data was termed a “new natural resource”. Based on these
shortcuts, the field was able to deliver machine translation, speech recognition,
object recognition, spell checkers, product recommendation, and much more.
None of these tasks had been successfully automated under the previous AI
paradigm.
These same shortcuts however are also behind some of the subtle side effects
that started being observed: they encouraged a business model of assertive data
collection, and personalised advertising; they allowed for subtle social biases to
infiltrate elements of AI systems, such as word embeddings used to represent
meaning; they might have encouraged the circulation of fake news by simply
focusing on click through rate maximisation; they are behind the effect known
as ‘filter bubbles’ [32]; they enabled delicate personal information to be inferred
from publicly available information; they delegate potentially important deci-
sions to systems that are not understandable to humans.
Taken together, these business and technical practices impose externalities
on their users, by reducing their autonomy and possibly even violating some
of their legal rights (such as the right to fair treatment, and more recently the
right to an explanation). Redressing this will require significant and expensive
re-work. It is this situation, of future costs being created, that we call the
“ethical debt” of Artificial Intelligence.
Ethical debt, much like technical debt, results from taking shortcuts in the
construction of software systems. Current practice in AI has made extensive
use of this debt, and while this may well have been the correct decision to push
the field forward, the time has come to start paying it back.
The Positive Side of Shortcuts. There can be situations where some debt
is useful. Before we focus on some negative fall-outs of the current methodology,
and on how to address them, we should briefly consider how the field would be
if we had not made these choices. Finding a solution to AI’s debt will require
understanding what are the alternatives, and we should not fool ourselves into
thinking that we have easy technical solutions: it is quite possible that solutions
will have to come from different business models. While there seems to be some
irony in the way we sought a free lunch and instead ended up in debt, and
perhaps there is, the alternatives to the current path are not much better.
Without Shortcut 1 (machine learning instead of modeling), we would still
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be struggling to come up with a set of explicit rules for a computer to distin-
guish a cat from a dog, or two handwritten letters, or to suggest a good book
based on your previous reading history. That route had defied researchers for
decades despite considerable investment, and there is no indication that it would
work now. Without Shortcut 2 (gathering data already in the wild rather than
producing our own) we would not only have had to prepay a significant amount
of money to produce large amounts of training data, but we would have had to
do this without even knowing if this would have been of any help. Furthermore,
it is notoriously difficult to elicit certain types of information from human an-
notators, including rules to suggest books, or even just examples of appropriate
suggestions for books or videos. Without Shortcut 3 (using implicit feedback to
guide learning in agents) we would have been stuck with asking users to commu-
nicate to the agent explicitly and directly what type of items they wanted, and
how satisfied they were with the suggestions they received. It has been known
for a long time that users are often not fully aware of their information needs,
and tend to resist providing this kind of feedback.
But at this point, with the knowledge and technology we have today, it has
to be possible to reconsider some of those decisions.
Remedies to the Shortcuts. In the case of Shortcut 1, the use of causal
(parametric, interpretable) models in certain domains might be mandated, even
if accuracy might suffer, in the name of transparency of decisions. There are spe-
cific areas where users are entitled to explanations for consequential decisions,
and it could be mandated that in these domains only weaker - but explain-
able - AI tools can be used. This would be a political decision and also a big
change. Are we prepared to abandon black-box agents, paying the price of
explicit modeling, and perhaps even hold back in certain areas where we funda-
mentally cannot develop those models? It seems unlikely, but we should have
this conversation, at least for select sectors.
In the case of Shortcut 2 (training AI on data from the wild), we should at
least be able to add some nuance: there can be types of data that can only be
used for certain types of applications. Perhaps a given textual corpus can be
suitable for training spelling correction agents, but not for learning the meaning
of sensitive words (perhaps because it originates from a community with very
different values than those that we want to be reflected in our agent). And
a type of certification could even be imagined to state that origin. There are
already specific lists of domains where decisions are expected to be unbiased,
and for these domains we might request that AI agents are trained on better
understood data sources, which may also be more expensive, making implicit
biases explicit. We should care about our ‘data supply chain’ as much as we care
about our food supply. This can be defined as the sequences of processes involved
in the production and distribution of training data, which form the various
models found in current AI systems. Each module might be based on different
datasets, each of them in turn potentially shaped by yet other datasets. Are
we prepared to pay the cost of generating, annotating and curating expensive
datasets, matching the rigour used for clinical trial data? This might be unlikely,
but we could regulate more closely the data markets, and develop screenings to
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formalise which applications a given dataset is suitable for. Just gathering data
from the wild without any further considerations is simply not safe.
In the case of Shortcut 3 (implicit feedback), it is possible to imagine that in
certain domains the intelligent agent can only be allowed to learn from explicit,
direct and voluntary communications from the user, rather than from observing
their behaviour. This could be done in situations where there is the suspicion of
filter bubbles or behavioural addiction. Deliberately using psychometric signals
to infer how a user might react to a proposal might have to be banned, as possi-
bly many forms of nudging. Regulating the use of implicit signals by intelligent
agents seems to be a reasonable request
All this will probably cost more, might well reduce the performance of our
systems, and their ease of use. Yet, domain by domain, we might decide that in
some cases this is what we want. This would be part of paying back the ethical
debt created over ten years ago by taking a series of shortcuts. We should
not demonise those past decisions, as we would not have an AI industry today
without them, but now the time has come to revisit some of them.
The implicit-explicit dimension. An important dimension that has so
far been neglected in the analysis of social implications of AI systems, is the
spectrum from implicit to explicit information. This covers the representation of
knowledge within the agents; the mechanisms for making decisions; the signals
contained in the training data; the biases that might be there; and the signals
used as feedback to guide learning. This should also cover - of course - the
explicit consent of users of AI systems; and explicit focus on “the data supply
chain” as an object of analysis. Closer regulation of the data markets would be
facilitated by using this distinction.
The use of explicitly created data might be mandated in situations where
both the experimental conditions need to be tightly controlled, and the mean-
ing of annotation must have been carefully agreed. The use of explicit relevance
feedback by users would also be an important requirement in some conditions,
preventing agents from ‘eavesdropping’ and using information unintentionally
disclosed by users behaviour. Information about preferences is personal infor-
mation, and gathering it requires explicit and informed consent, and explicit
opt-in.
Explicit knowledge representation in AI models would allow easier sanity
checks, both for bias and for explanations, but of course this is likely to limit
the accuracy of systems. Explicit certification of biases that are present in the
training data would also go a long way, allowing developers to make informed
decisions about which components and data to include in their products. Future
agents, in certain domains, might need to allow for the tracking of all sources
of data which were used to train each of its components, and assessing their
biases.
Finally, when we communicate with other users on social networks, or we
access databases of content, it would be useful to drop the pretense that this is
a direct interaction, making instead explicit the presence of an intelligent agent
acting as intermediator- so that we can explicitly decide which engagement
actions are communicative acts aimed at the other users, and which ones are
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aimed at the recommending agent. We should not conflate the two types of
communicative acts.
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